Casting the Net: Another Confusing Analysis of Personal Jurisdiction and Internet Contacts in Telco Communications v. An Apple A Day by Kidd, Donnie L., Jr.
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 32 | Issue 2 Article 8
1998
Casting the Net: Another Confusing Analysis of
Personal Jurisdiction and Internet Contacts in
Telco Communications v. An Apple A Day
Donnie L. Kidd Jr.
University of Richmond
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Internet Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Richmond Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Donnie L. Kidd Jr., Casting the Net: Another Confusing Analysis of Personal Jurisdiction and Internet Contacts in Telco Communications v.
An Apple A Day, 32 U. Rich. L. Rev. 505 (1998).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol32/iss2/8
CASTING THE NET: ANOTHER CONFUSING ANALYSIS OF
PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND INTERNET CONTACTS IN
TELCO COMMUNICATIONS V. AN APPLE A DAY *
I. INTRODUCTION
The fascination of the Internet and "cyberspace" is its sense
of boundlessness.' A user seemingly can go anywhere, be any-
one, and do anything in a virtual world of information and
interactivity. Actions on-line, however, often may have real
world ramifications.2 The demarcation line between the phys-
ical and cyberspace "worlds" is not so pronounced that actions
occurring in one have no effect in the other.
Above all the fantastic claims of "virtuality" and reference to
some other-worldly "cyberspace," one must not forget that the
* 977 F. Supp. 404 (E.D. Va. 1997). Since Telco is a district court opinion and
is subject to appellate review, the focus of this article is not a full analysis of the
case, but an overview of traditional personal jurisdiction law, the treatment of
Internet-based contacts with a forum, and the rapidly expanding rift among the
circuits reconciling the traditionalist approach to new technology. Thus, this article is
not an "ordinary" casenote, but a survey of current issues in the field using Telco as
a recent case that establishes a gauge to measure the widening circuit split.
1. See Gwenn M. Kalow, Note, From the Internet to Court: Exercising Jurisdic-
tion over World Wide Web Communications, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2241, 2242 (1997)
(asserting that the Internet is "void of territorial boundaries" and that communication
on-line is "not actually conducted in a particular location, but rather in the ephemer-
al world of 'Cyberspace'); see also Jason L. Brodsky, Civil Procedure-Surfin' the
Stream of Commerce: CompuServe v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996), 70
TEbiP. L. REv. 825, 825 (1997) (stating that the Internet is "faceless, nameless, and
exists in a reality beyond physical boundaries"); Lief Swedlow, Note, Three Paradigms
of Presence: A Solution for Personal Jurisdiction on the Internet, 22 OKLA. Crry U. L.
REV. 337, 338 (1997) (analogizing the "cyberspace frontier" to the "wild west").
2. See Swedlow, supra note 1, at 338 (detailing the lawsuits developing from
interstate computer activity). For example, fashion designer Tommy Hilfiger, whose
clothing line profits from a substantial inner city market, was forced to issue a public
statement after a false report alleged that he had made racist comments during an
interview. The report, which drew national attention, originally stemmed from a sin-
gle Usenet post written by an individual who distributed the information around the
world to hundreds of on-line Newsgroups. See Rumors: All the Fashion, INTERNET
WORLD, July 1997, at 127.
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Internet is a communications tool that exists but for the grace
of telephone lines, satellites, and computer terminals.' When a
person logs on to the Internet in Missouri and links to a site in
Virginia, she is not traveling into some unreal and incorporeal
dimension. She is using a computer terminal in one state and
using interstate phone connections to receive electronic trans-
missions from another computer in Virginia.4  While the
Internet is a multimedia device combining aspects of print,
television and radio communication, it nonetheless is composed
of a physical infrastructure and can be used for a wide variety
of real world applications.5
Today, courts are beginning to face an assortment of cases in
which one party has used the Internet to injure another party.'
Software piracy, defamation, fraud, intellectual property in-
fringement or misappropriation, and breach of contractual
agreement through the Internet are quickly finding their way
3. Foi purposes of this article, the author assumes that the reader has a basic
understanding of the Internet and how it is used in its various forms, including a
minimal understanding of the use of e-mail, web browsing, chat services and trans-
mission of information between computer terminals. The cases in this article almost
exclusively rely on knowledge of the World Wide Web (a graphical user interface, or
GUI, that is only part of the Internet) and e-mail capabilities. If the reader should
require or desire a brief overview of Internet structure and function, the author di-
rects attention to Kalow, supra note 1, at 2243-49. Additionally, the reader may ob-
tain an in-depth analysis of Internet functions, regulatory systems and telecommuni-
cations history in Ilene Knable Gotts & Alan D. Rutenberg, Navigating the Global
Information Superhighway: A Bumpy Road Lies Ahead, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 275
(1995).
At this point, the author also notes that the term "cyberspace" has become
passe in professional circles in favor of the terms "e-commerce" and "electronic trans-
missions." Since this terminology comports with the author's own belief that Internet
use should have physical world referents rather than the ephemerality of
"cyberspatial" dimensions, the term "cyberspace" will not be used.
4. But see Kalow, supra note 1, at 2247 ("An Internet user traveling from site to
site is exploring an on-line world with no physical boundaries."). This approach to
conceptualizing Internet communications fails to reconcile the simple fact that such
transmitted information must reside on a machine located in physical space and that
access to this "world" requires the use of another machine in a specific and identifi-
able location.
5. See Gotts & Rutenberg, supra note 3, at 276-77 (discussing the multimedia
nature of the Information Super Highway); Swedlow, supra note 1, at 349-52 (detail-
ing various uses of the Internet, including Usenet, Internet Relay Chat (IRC), File
Transfer Protocol (FTP), e-mail and other uses).
6. See Swedlow, supra note 1. One interesting side note is that some commenta-
tors believe that "computer crimes are simply old crimes committed in new ways."
Gotts & Rutenberg, supra note 3, at 295.
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into court as more people and businesses go on-line.7 A prima-
ry issue in some of these cases is whether a court may assert
personal jurisdiction when the defendant is not a resident of
the forum and her only contact with the forum is through use
of the Internet.! Thus far, courts have been left to rely upon
traditional personal jurisdiction analysis under state long-arm
statutes and due process considerations, while attempting to
reconcile the Internet with existing media sources for which
case law exists.9
In September, 1997, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia denied a nonresident defendant's
motion to dismiss an action in defamation and other tortious
7. In 1998, e-commerce is expected to yield revenues of over three billion dollars,
create over 500,000 new jobs, and substantially increase economic growth. See Gotts
& Rutenberg, supra note 3, at 275. This revenue increase represents a growth rate in
excess of 500% over the past four years and is attributed to movement in the com-
puter and telecommunications market. See id. The current regulatory structure, how-
ever, has been incapable of staying abreast of the rapid developments, leading to a
number of abuses and hidden issues that remain unresolved. See id. at 277-78.
8. See infra Part H.B (discussing various cases in which the issue of personal
jurisdiction arose in the exclusive context of Internet contacts).
Personal jurisdiction or jurisdiction in personam is defined as the "[plower
which a court has over the defendant's person and which is required before a court
can enter a personal or in personam judgment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 766 (6th
ed. 1990). Personal jurisdiction is a threshold issue, and if the court cannot meet the
requirements, then it is estopped from asserting any authority over a defendant. See,
e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) (granting defendants an initial defense to challenge an
assertion of a court's personal jurisdiction). A more in-depth treatment of personal ju-
risdiction over nonresident defendants and Internet contacts will be provided in Part
II, infra.
9. A great deal of contention among scholarly articles exists in regard to wheth-
er Internet jurisdiction should be premised on traditional models or novel theories.
See Corey B. Ackerman, World-Wide Volkswagen, Meet the World Wide Web: An Ex-
amination of Personal Jurisdiction Applied to a New World, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
403, 432 (1997) ("New rules are not necessary provided that the courts fully appreci-
ate how Web pages operate, and respect what is actually required by International
Shoe and its progeny.") (italics added); see also Kalow, supra note 1, at 2271 (stating
that the plurality decision of Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102
(1987), should be used in Internet jurisdiction cases). But see Brodsky, supra note 1,
at 856 (rejecting the stream of commerce approach to Internet jurisdiction and stating
that the "unique new medium" requires a new test beyond traditional analysis); Gotts
& Rutenberg, supra note 3, at 277 (stating that the "current regulatory structure
simply is inadequate to handle the traffic of the information superhighway" and that
cooperation among government and self-regulators will be necessary); Swedlow, supra
note 1, at 372 (stating that courts require a new working paradigm for Internet ju-
risdiction analysis). The divergence stems in part from the circuit split that has aris-
en when courts examine Internet jurisdiction. See infra Part ll.B.
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injury for lack of personal jurisdiction, even though the only
contact the defendant had with Virginia consisted of several
Internet advertisements. The court in Telco Communications v.
An Apple A Day"° asserted personal jurisdiction over the de-
fendant and found that the contacts satisfied Virginia's long-
arm statute and met due process considerations. The court
considered an Internet advertisement a continuous and regular
solicitation of business in the forum and held that the defen-
dant necessarily relied upon the use of Virginia facilities to
achieve the injury." The evidence, however, indicated that Vir-
ginia was not even the intended target for the advertisement
that was released, and that the defendant did not seek to dis-
tribute the advertisement in the forum. 2
The purpose of this article is to examine Telco's holding
among a series of recent decisions analyzing Internet jurisdic-
tion. Although the case is a district court opinion and, there-
fore, is subject to appellate review, Telco's analysis of the devel-
oping law of "Internet jurisdiction" is a valuable indication of
Virginia's and the Fourth Circuit's opinions on the issue. It also
clearly indicates the need for all circuits to address the issue of
Internet contacts. Part II of this article traces the history of
personal jurisdiction and its evolution in over a century's worth
of Supreme Court precedent. Following this discussion, recent
case law involving Internet jurisdiction is provided to familiar-
ize the reader with the application of the traditional personal
jurisdiction test to Internet contacts and the disparity in circuit
decisions addressing this issue. Part III is a narrative of the
Telco decision and its authority. Part IV provides an analysis of
the personal jurisdiction analysis of Telco and its reliance on
prior Internet jurisdiction case law that truly was not disposi-
tive of the issues presented. The following conclusions will be
presented: (1) Telco's analysis rests upon unsubstantiated para-
digms, rather than legal authority, of Internet concepts; (2) part
of the court's analysis fails to satisfy the long-arm statute as it
traditionally has been interpreted; and (3) the due process re-
quirement of reasonable foreseeability cannot be met as provid-
ed by the court's holding. The final section of this article will
10. 977 F. Supp. 404 (E.D. Va. 1997).
11. See id. at 406-07.
12. See id. at 407. For a full discussion of the case, see infra Part III.
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examine Telco's. position among Internet jurisdiction cases and
the complexity of providing a simultaneously meaningful and
simple solution to the jurisdictional issues presented throughout
this article.
II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION: SUPREME COURT HISTORY AND
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNET JURISDICTION
Personal jurisdiction is an issue of foremost importance. 3
13. Unless a federal statute applies, both state and federal courts must look to
the long-arm statute of the state in which the court sits for purposes of determining
personal jurisdiction over a defendant that does not reside in the forum in which the
court sits. See Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694, 713 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring); see also FED. R. CIv. P. 4(e) (federal rule
determining whether a defendant is subject to service, which itself is a prerequisite
to personal jurisdiction).
Generally, application of a long-arm statute consists of two steps: (1) applica-
tion of the long-arm statute's language to the circumstances of the case; and (2) a
due process analysis under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to determine if the
Constitution would permit an assertion of jurisdiction. See Insurance Corp. of Ir., 456
U.S. at 713 (Powell, J., concurring). In some states, the long-arm statute has been
extended to the full extent Constitutionally permitted by the Due Process Clause,
such that the two step analysis collapses into a single question of due process con-
straints. See Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., 701 P.2d 1106, 1109-10 (Utah
1985) (collapsing the personal jurisdiction issue into a single due process analysis
since the long-arm statute is permitted to extend to the full limit of Constitutional
limitations). Long-arm statutes themselves may limit personal jurisdiction to specific
situations below the extent permitted by the Constitution; these limits often require
business activity, contracting, tortious acts and certain types of injuries to occur be-
fore jurisdiction applies. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1 (Michie 1992)
(Virginia's long-arm statute).
Briefly, the due process analysis examines minimum contacts under the stan-
dard established by International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
While minimum contacts do not require that the defendant be "physically present" in
the forum, the contacts must show that the defendant has "purposefully avail[ed]
himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state such that he in-
vokes the benefits and protections of the law." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 247
(1958). Moreover, the defendant's contacts must be of a "quality and nature that he
would anticipate being haled into that jurisdiction's court." World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980). Finally, the contacts must be such that
jurisdiction in the forum is "reasonably foreseeable" by the defendant. Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-76 (1985).
The Supreme Court has held that contacts that are "random, fortuitous, or
attenuated" are insufficient for personal jurisdiction. Id. at 475; see also Asahi Metal
Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plurality opinion) (stating that
placement of an item in the stream of commerce is itself insufficient for jurisdictional
purposes without purposeful availment). Most importantly, the contacts must satisfy
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co., 326
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Without such jurisdiction, a court lacks authority to dispose of
any matter relating to the case at hand. 4 Traditionally, juris-
diction over a party involved has not presented significant ob-
stacles. The basis for jurisdiction is asserted, and if there is no
challenge, the court proceeds to try the more "important" issues
that comprise the dispute." Even when a defendant challenges
personal jurisdiction, the court swiftly may resolve the conten-
tion by giving the plaintiff both the burden of proof and the full
benefit of its assertions of personal jurisdiction over the defen-
dant." Provided that the court adheres to a liberal application
of personal jurisdiction analysis, a defendant often must realize
that challenging jurisdiction is an accepted tactic, but one that
rarely succeeds. 7
This is not to say that personal jurisdiction always has been
simplistic or even that it has become so today. Instead, an
assertion of personal jurisdiction represents the end-product of
an analysis that examines a defendant's activities and her ex-
pectations of suit in a particular forum. 8 The test incorporates
U.S. at 316.
Additionally, the contacts generally must have some relation to the cause of
action (specific jurisdiction), although a court may exercise general jurisdiction when
the cause of action and contacts are unrelated but the contacts are "continuous and
systematic." See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, SA. v. Hall, 46 U.S. 408, 415-
16 (1984) (finding that general jurisdiction was improper since defendants contacts
with the forum were neither continuous nor systematic).
14. See supra note 8.
15. For example, a defendant in federal court is permitted under Rule 12(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to challenge personal jurisdiction in its initial
pleading, but the defendant is not required to assert such a challenge. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 12(b). If the challenge is not made, then there is a permanent waiver of the
defense under Rule 12(h) and the court proceeds on the merits of the case. See FED.
R. Crv. P. 12(h).
16. Once a defendant raises a question of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears
the burden of showing that jurisdiction is permitted. See Mylan Lab., Inc. v. Akzo,
N.V., 2 F.3d 56, 59-60 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Woodson, 444 U.S. at 291 (requiring
plaintiff to demonstrate that personal jurisdiction over defendant is proper if it com-
ports with due process). The affirmations of the plaintiffs complaint alleging jurisdic-
tion, however, are construed in the most favorable light towards the plaintiff in the
determination of the issue. See Mylan Lab, 2 F.3d at 59-60.
17. The vague, discretionary notions of "purposeful availment," "substantial con-
tacts," and "reasonably foreseeable," when combined with a judicial attitude favoring
the plaintiffs presentation of the matter, create a stacked deck against the
defendant's challenges to personal jurisdiction in all but the most egregious failures
to show that any contacts really did exist. See Memorial Hosp. Sys. v. Fisher Ins.
Agency, Inc., 835 S.W.2d 645, 649-50 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
18. See supra note 13. The due process analysis alone considers a number of
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both hard facts and qualitative measures of foreseeability, fair-
ness, and purposeful availment-a test that may be resolved
quickly by recourse to physical contacts within a forum, but
may require meticulous examination when the defendant does
not reside physically in the forum."9 Even beyond distinguish-
ing between physical presence and presence through conduct,
the Supreme Court has made further differentiations based
upon connections between the injuries and the forum. When the
cause of action is related to the forum contacts, specific jurisdic-
tion exists. General jurisdiction lies when the injury and the
contacts are unrelated. ° The battleground for jurisdictional
issues has been drawn under these standards, and the result is
a line of cases that delineate the boundaries of the law in this
area.
21
This section examines the series of Supreme Court cases that
have defined personal jurisdiction and demonstrated its evolving
nature. As culture has advanced and technological innovation
progressed such that the population is no longer restrained in
its ability to travel and communicate with distant localities,
personal jurisdiction analysis has also advanced to determine
when a party is "present and conducting itself' in a forum, such
that jurisdiction is fair and reasonably foreseeable.' The latter
factors when courts examine the relationship of the defendant, plaintiff, and forum.
See Marquette Natl Bank v. Norris, 270 N.W.2d 290, 295 (Minn. 1978). These factors
include the quantity, quality and nature of the contacts as well as the connection of
the contacts with the cause of action and interests of convenience and resolution. See
id.
19. See supra note 13.
20. The Supreme Court has only had the opportunity to address general jurisdic-
tion twice, the principal case being Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, SA. v. Hall,
466 U.S. 408 (1984). Two main questions are posed in general jurisdiction cases: (1)
Are there minimum contacts? (2) If so, may the court assert jurisdiction even though
the injury is unrelated? The first is an analysis similar to that provided in Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945), and the second will rely, in
part, on the language of the state long-arm statute. General jurisdiction remains an
ill-defined concept that rarely requires use.
In contrast, specific jurisdiction arises when minimum contacts are related to
the injury and comprises the overwhelming majority of jurisdiction cases. Since the
Internet cases discussed in this article involve "on-line" injuries such as intellectual
property infringement, defamation, and breach of contract that occur in the plaintiffs
forum, specific jurisdiction should be presumed for these cases.
21. See infra Part IIA.
22. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 313-15 (noting that telephone and automo-
bile travel had added significantly to the ability to reach distant forums). The modem
1998] 511
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:505
part of this section examines the most recent technological
innovation-the Internet-and how the recent case law has
struggled in its attempt to provide a consistent treatment in
light of traditional analysis.'
A. Personal Jurisdiction and the Supreme Court
Personal jurisdiction first received its status as a recognized
constitutional limitation on courts in 1877 when the Supreme
Court decided Pennoyer v. Neff,' and has continued to receive
treatment throughout the decades. Initially rooted in the physi-
cal presence of a person or corporation in a forum, personal
jurisdiction analysis evolved under the Supreme Court's guiding
hand as technology advanced and parties could conduct activi-
ties or cause injuries in distant forums without being physically
present. The developing case law molded a concept of "presence"
defined by both a person's purposeful contacts, physical or com-
municative, with a forum, and due process concerns.' The re-
sult presents a series of Supreme Court cases capturing the de-
velopment of the law, each case building upon its predecessors.
The cornerstone of personal jurisdiction law as defined by the
Supreme Court was hewn in Pennoyer v. Neff. While the case
has since been modified by further concerns," Pennoyer provid-
ed the initial stepping stone for further analysis: a defendant
must be present physically in the forum or appear on a volun-
tary basis in order to settle a personal claim against him or
her." Pennoyer held land in the forum, but resided in another
state. The plaintiff brought claims against Pennoyer himself,
but attempted to assert jurisdiction through Pennoyer's land
conception is that increasingly powerful and efficient technology permits one to en-
gage in "interstate commerce without leaving the office" on an everyday basis.
Brodsky, supra note 1, at 825.
23. The Internet is the widest reaching of all communications technologies to date
and provides greater opportunity to reach out rapidly to distant forums than before
possible. See Swedlow, supra note 1, at 338. The popularity and power of the medium
is attested by its growth in the economic sector. See supra note 7.
24. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
25. See discussion infra Part II.A.
26. The concerns have developed as the result of increasing technology and ability
to reach other jurisdictions without having to physically travel to them. See Swedlow,
supra note 1, at 338; see also International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 313-15.
27. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733.
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holdings. The Court held that jurisdiction would be premised ei-
ther upon physical presence for in personam jurisdiction, or the
presence of property for in rem jurisdiction, but that the two
were not interchangeable.' Since Pennoyer neither physically
resided in the forum nor voluntarily consented to jurisdiction,
the Court held that personal jurisdiction could not be asserted
in the forum in an action against Pennoyer's person. 9
In 1945, the Supreme Court decided International Shoe Co. v.
Washington" and laid the foundation for modern personal ju-
risdiction. Since the time of Pennoyer, telephones and automo-
biles have extended vastly the ability of persons to travel and
contact distant places without having to reside there. When the
State of Washington brought an action against International
Shoe, the latter asserted that there could be no personal juris-
diction because the company had no permanent employees,
offices, or sales force in the state."' In response, Washington
asserted that International Shoe salesmen had traveled into
Washington, made intermittent sales that were shipped into the
state to state residents, and operated temporary offices in the
state. On this basis, Washington claimed that the company had
voluntarily consented to jurisdiction in the state through its
activities. 2 The Supreme Court agreed and asserted personal
jurisdiction by introducing the "minimum contacts" doctrine.3
The decision permitted a state to assert personal jurisdiction
over a non-resident defendant when the defendant had estab-
lished certain contacts with the state, such that the interest
and power of the state was evoked without violating "tradition-
al notions of fair play and substantial justice" inherent in the
defendant's due process rights.'
28. See id. at 733-34.
29. See id.
30. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
31. See id. at 313-15.
32. See id. at 313-15, 319-20.
33. See id. at 316. The Court announced that when the defendant has maintained
minimum contacts in a state "such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice," personal jurisdiction is per-
mitted. Id.
34. Id.
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Later, McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,35 would
provide a high water mark for personal jurisdiction. Expanding
minimum contacts to the breaking point, the Court held that
personal jurisdiction in California was proper since the Texas-
based defendant maintained a single insurance policy in the
state.3 6 Although the policyholder had purchased the original
insurance policy from an insurer in Arizona that was subse-
quently purchased by the defendant, the dispositive point was
that the defendant had failed to cancel the policy-and in fact
had issued a reinsurance policy-after it purchased the Arizona
business and continued to accept payments from the plaintiff in
California." Further, the defendant committed a breach of con-
tract in the state when it refused a claims payment. From this,
the Court concluded that minimum contacts were met since the
defendant had purposefully availed itself of California business
and committed an injury directed at the forum."8
In 1984, the Supreme Court withdrew from McGee's expan-
sive position in Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, SA. v.
Hall.9 Filing the case in Texas, the plaintiff brought wrongful
death claims stemming from an accident in South America.
While the defendant performed business in the state, the acci-
dent itself was indirectly related to that business. The Court
determined that since the defendant was a non-resident and the
cause of action neither occurred in the forum nor was it related
to the contacts, further precautions were necessary to meet due
process. ° The Court held that these circumstances would be
35. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
36. See id. at 223. But see generally Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958)
(denying personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendant when plaintiff insurance
policy holder unilaterally moved to another state after purchasing policy).
37. See McGee, 355 U.S. at 221-22 (noting that defendant had no contacts in Cali-
fornia besides plaintiffs policy issued from the former Arizona company).
38. The Court noted that an expanding national economy, ability to conduct inter-
state commercial transactions, and communication had become exceedingly easier in
the twentieth century such that an extension of personal jurisdiction should occur as
well. See id. at 223. Notice should be given, however, to the contractual nature of the
injury, which assuages a degree of the extremism of the factual interpretation which
found personal jurisdiction proper, especially since the defendant should have reason-
ably foreseen that a claim issue would arise in the forum. See id. at 223-24; see also
Russell J. Weintraub, A Map Out of the Jurisdictional Labyrinth, 28 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 531, 535 (1995) (commenting on the extensive reach of the McGee holding).
39. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
40. See id. at 415-16.
[Vol. 32:505514
TELCO COMMUNICATIONS V. AN APPLE A DAY
defined under the rubric "general jurisdiction" and required
that when the action was unrelated to the nonresident's con-
tacts, the contacts with the forum must be continuous, regular,
and systematic, rather than random, fortuitous, or by chance.4'
Since Helicopteros' contacts with Texas were not part of an on-
going relationship, the contacts were not sufficient to meet
general jurisdiction requirements.42
In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,' the Supreme
Court declined to assert personal jurisdiction over New York
dealership defendants. The dealership had sold a car to New
York residents, who subsequently were involved in an accident
while traveling through Oklahoma. While the international
manufacturer of the car was subject to jurisdiction since it had
dealerships in Oklahoma, the local dealers of New York were
not subject to jurisdiction." The Court held that there was no
evidence of any dealer contact with the forum other than the
car sold to the plaintiffs, and that while the dealers could have
predicted one of their cars would end up in Oklahoma, defend-
ing a suit in the forum was not reasonably foreseeable and
violated due process.45 Thus, merely putting an item into the
stream of commerce was not enough to satisfy due process
analysis.46
Five years later, in 1985, the Court reexamined the Interna-
tional Shoe holding in the case Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz.47 After intensive negotiation of a long term fran-
chise agreement with a Florida-based business, the Michigan-
based defendant breached the agreement and was sued in Flori-
da. The Court held that Florida courts had jurisdiction upon
41. See id. at 414 n.9, 416-17. Note that minimum contacts still controlled the
question of personal jurisdiction, although cases of general jurisdiction required a
greater demonstration of "substantial" contacts with the forum.
42. See id. at 416.
43. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
44. See id. at 288-89 (noting that the manufacturer and importer, unlike the
dealer and regional distributor, had direct business connections with the forum and
did not challenge jurisdiction).
45. See id. at 297-98. While the both the manufacturer and dealer could reason-
ably foresee that the stream of commerce would carry the product into the forum, the
lack of any direct contact with the forum by the dealer made the possibility of suit
not reasonably foreseeable. See id.
46. See id.
47. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
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finding that the modem nature of business relations, communi-
cation, and the ability to reach distant forums without leaving
one's home required a reaffirmation of International Shoe's
"traditional notions" doctrine in view of recent developments.48
The concept of "fair play and substantial justice" was extended
to examine the defendant's ability to foresee distant litigation,
purposeful availment of the benefits and business of the forum's
residents, consent to jurisdiction, and the nexus between the
contacts and the cause of action.49
In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,0 the Su-
preme Court returned in part to the World-Wide Volkswagen
stream of commerce analysis when it refused to find personal
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant who manufactured compo-
nent parts (tire valves) for another manufacturer who distribut-
ed a finished product (tires) internationally.5' After a defective
motorcycle tire valve resulted in an accident, Asahi, a Japanese
company, was required to defend itself in California. On review,
the Court held that although Asahi could foresee that its prod-
ucts would and did end up in California, the mere knowledge
that a product was likely to be carried by the stream of com-
merce into a particular forum was insufficient for personal
jurisdiction.52 More than this mere knowledge was required,
and in this case, Asahi had no direct contacts with California
and had not availed itself of the market.53 Thus, jurisdiction
would have been in violation of the "traditional notions" ex-
pounded by International Shoe.54
Before moving on to the recent Internet cases, two other
Supreme Court cases are important for the analysis in this
article. First, Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,55 permitted per-
48. See id. at 471-78.
49. See id. at 478-87. Since Rudzewicz had an on-going relationship with Burger
King, contemplated a long term business relation, agreed to a forum selection clause,
and the contacts and the breach of contract action were directly related, the Court
held that Rudzewicz reasonably should have foreseen being haled into court in Flori-
da such that due process was not violated. See id. at 487.
50. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
51. See id. at 116.
52. See id. at 112-13.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 116.
55. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
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sonal jurisdiction over a non-resident publishing company for an
action in defamation. The court held that the magazine's
monthly sales to approximately 10,000 forum residents demon-
strated that the defendant had purposefully availed itself of the
laws, business, and protection of New Hampshire.56 Second, in
Calder v. Jones,57 the Supreme Court held that a California
action over a Florida tabloid was proper.5 8 Although the tab-
loid was based and printed in Florida and the allegedly defama-
tory article written in the state, the publishers also knew that
it had its largest sales in California, and that the greatest
injury to the person targeted would be in California."9 In addi-
tion to the publishers' purposeful availment of California, the
Court noted that an effects test figured into the determination
of personal jurisdiction. Since the defamation would have its
greatest injury in the forum and as such was targeted for the
effect, jurisdiction would be proper on this basis."
The Calder test for personal jurisdiction consists of an effects
test, a but-for test, and a reasonableness test.6' The effects
test involves finding that the defendant (1) made an intentional
act (2) aimed at the forum (3) causing foreseeable harm in the
forum.62 Once this "purposeful availment" section is satisfied,
the court looks at the relation of the injury and the contact
under the but-for test and then examines the parties' interests
and the fairness of jurisdiction under the reasonableness
prong.0 This test especially is useful in defamation cases
where a defendant may have no other contacts with a forum,
but has targeted a resident with the knowledge that the extent
of the injury will be incurred in that forum. While the "but for"
test has been used in the Ninth Circuit," the test is men-
tioned rarely in other circuits.
56. See id. at 774-75, 781.
57. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
58. See id. at 791.
59. See id. at 789-90.
60. See id.
61. See Panavision Intl, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616, 621-22 (C.D. Cal.
1996).
62. See id. at 621.
63. See id. at 622.
64. See Edias Software Int'l, L.L.C. v. Basis Int'l Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413, 420 (D.
Ariz. 1996).
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The history of personal jurisdiction decisions by the Supreme
Court demonstrates a continuously evolving theory of "pres-
ence." As travel and communications capabilities have expanded
the ability to reach and affect other forums, the Court has
liberalized personal jurisdiction rules from the original "physical
presence" requirements found in Pennoyer. Today, the analysis
would appear to dictate that a defendant is subject to personal
jurisdiction only if she: (1) resides in the forum; (2) consents to
jurisdiction; or (3) has purposefilly established minimum con-
tacts with the forum such that an exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion neither offends "traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice," nor is so unlikely that the defendant reason-
ably cannot foresee being haled into court there.65 The latter
analysis in turn will rely upon the relationship and interests of
the defendant, plaintiff, and forum, as well as the nexus be-
tween the injury alleged and the contacts established.
B. Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet
While the core concept of the Internet has existed for some
time, the last few years have witnessed a veritable explosion of
interest and use of the Internet." Simply speaking, the
Internet is a network of networks-a network that currently
serves approximately fifty million people and expects to double
its audience by the turn of the millennium.67 The Internet is a
global communications medium that permits world-wide access
and communications capabilities with anyone else that is con-
nected to the Internet. E-mail, video-conferencing, chat rooms,
file transfer, and even simple websites permit users to convey
and send information quickly and efficiently virtually anywhere
in the world, and with the capability for interaction. The seem-
ingly exponential increase in use has been spurred in part by
evolving technology, increased infrastructure, and, most impor-
65. See Swedlow, supra note 1, at 341-47.
66. See supra note 7. Ironically, the "Internet" began as a communications net-
work for the military several decades ago and then expanded in the 1970s as a com-
munications tool primarily for civil government and university use. Even as late as
the mid-1980s, before rapid growth began, few developers foresaw the commercial
potential of the Internet which has begun to blossom in the past few years. See Jeff
Ubois, Mass Appeal, INTERNET WORLD, April 1997, at 62, 64.
67. See supra note 7.
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tantly, the realization by commercial entities and other persons
of the communications power of the Internet and the World
Wide Web."
The primary issue of Internet law has been the difficulty in
defining its structure. 9 Application of various paradigms are
all somewhat incomplete since the Internet is not quite like any
of its communications predecessors.70 Instead, the Internet is a
multimedia medium, incorporating aspects of both broadcast
and print media while available instantaneously to a global
audience. In fact, the Internet has developed into a "world" for-
mulated in "cyberspace" outside of the physical boundaries
traditionally observed.7' This "other-realm" conception has
clashed with jurisdictional rules that rely on contacts defined
by physical parameters, whether that contact is a residence, a
contract signed in the forum, an injury that occurs on the high-
way, or a magazine that is sold at the corner store. Thus, the
cases that have examined jurisdiction involving Internet con-
tacts have had to determine if use of the Internet's capabilities
provides "presence" sufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts
and due process analyses of traditional jurisdiction jurispru-
dence.
Overall, there are three types of Internet jurisdiction cases.
First, there are those cases that refuse to exercise jurisdiction
over persons who only use the Internet to post or access infor-
mation generally accessible to others on-line. Second, there are
cases that establish jurisdiction for virtually any use of the
Internet, even if only for the creation of a website. Finally,
there are Internet cases where specific use of the medium dem-
onstrates direct analogies to "physical" analogs in which juris-
diction has held or not.
68. See generally Gotts & Rutenberg, supra note 3 (discussing the history of tele-
communications innovation and regulatory treatment in light of the recent leaps tak-
en to advance the Information Super Highway).
69. See generally Swedlow, supra note 1, at 340 (examining the possibility of
three models of Internet structure and rejecting current views of structuralism as
inadequate to meet the legal obligations thrust upon it).
70. See Kalow, supra note 1, at 2243-49 (discussing the unique aspects of the
Internet).
71. See supra notes 3-4.
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1. Refusal to Find Personal Jurisdiction on the Basis of
Internet Presence
7 2
A number of cases have refused to exercise jurisdiction over a
defendant for her use of the Internet or on-line capabilities. In
these cases, the important facts to note are that the use of the
on-line medium is the primary contact with the forum in ques-
tion, and that the deciding courts clearly recognize that the use
is geographically inconsequential insofar as the particular forum
is concerned.
First, in Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King,73 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit re-
fused to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant for his
maintenance of a web page that allegedly offended trademark
rights of the plaintiff. The plaintiffs owned and operated The
Blue Note jazz club in New York and had trademark protection
for the name. King opened a jazz club under the same name in
Missouri and later developed a web page, accessible over the
Internet, which listed ticket information, a local number for
reservations, a disclaimer that the restaurant was not associat-
ed with The Blue Note in New York, and a hyperlink to the
New York restaurant's website.74 King had no contacts with
New York and the clientele of the restaurant was almost exclu-
sively state residents. Further, the tickets advertised on the
web page had to be purchased using a Missouri number and
picked up in Missouri.75
Both the trial and appellate court declined to exercise person-
al jurisdiction. The issue was whether a website, which was
generally accessible to anyone and which contained a local
Missouri phone number, was an offer to sell merchandise in
72. The author apologizes in advance for the length and detail of the following
subsections. Personal jurisdiction analysis is fact intensive insofar as it must focus on
the individual's contacts with a forum. By including many of these facts in the
following material, the author hopes to provide a clear analysis of the courts'
rationales for asserting jurisdiction without sending the reader to the case reporters
to resolve any lingering questions.
73. 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
74. See 937 F. Supp. at 297-98.
75. See id. at 300.
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New York."s The trial court found no tortious injury caused by
defendant's actions in the forum since any injury required affir-
mative acts by the Internet user to obtain tickets and those
acts would occur in Missouri." Further, there was no injury
from an act outside the forum since New York's long-arm stat-
ute required such jurisdiction to rely upon a showing of
defendant's substantial revenue from interstate commerce,
which King's clientele did not demonstrate. '8 Thus, King could
not reasonably foresee suit in New York and the due process
component was not met since there had been no purposeful
availment of the forum. s In so holding, the court analogized
posting a website to placing a product in the stream of com-
merce, such that access in a forum may be foreseeable, but the
defendant has not availed himself to suit in the forum.s On
appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision
and noted the practical use of traditional jurisdiction paradigms
as applied to the Internet."1
Presenting a somewhat different case, Pres-Kap, Inc. v. Sys-
tem One, Direct Access, Inc.," involved the lease of electronic
reservation equipment used to access another forum. System
One provided on-line electronic reservation equipment to travel
agencies and maintained a database in Florida for access. Sys-
tem One's office in New York initiated contact with Pres-Kap
travel agency and negotiated a contract. Besides accessing the
database and sending payments to Miami, Pres-Kap had no
contact with Florida and dealt exclusively with System One's
New York office." When System One brought an action for
76. See id. at 297.
77. See id. at 299.
78. See id. at 300.
79. King's website, as demonstrated by the ticket procedure, was found to serve a
local audience in Missouri rather than an attempt to take advantage of the New
York audience. See id. at 301. While the website was similar to a national adver-
tisement, the court analogized it to placing a product in the stream of commerce such
that there was no purposeful availment. See id; see also discussion of WorldWide
Volkswagen and Asahi Metal, supra Part HA.
80. See Bensusan Restaurant, 937 F. Supp. at 301.
81. The appellate court agreed entirely with the district court's analysis while
noting that attempt to define the law applicable to the Internet was "like trying to
board a moving bus." Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 27 (2d Cir.
1997).
82. 636 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
83. See id. at 1352-53.
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breach of lease agreement in Florida, Pres-Kap challenged the
court's jurisdiction.
The District Court of Appeal of Florida held that it had no
personal jurisdiction over Pres-Kap.' The court found that the
minimum contacts were insufficient, that suit was not reason-
ably foreseeable in the forum and that jurisdiction would vio-
late "traditional notions of fair dealing and substantial jus-
tice."85 The court found that merely accessing the server and
mailing payments to Florida were insufficient contacts and that
the totality of circumstances did not demonstrate the necessary
"presence" for jurisdiction." In closing, the court warned that
finding personal jurisdiction would herald a substantial danger
to the livelihood of on-line communications and legal power
over those who utilized them.7
Several other cases have adhered to limiting "Internet juris-
diction." In Naxos Resources Ltd. v. Southam, Inc.,' the court
denied general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant whose
only contacts with the forum were several third tier subsidiar-
ies and an allegedly defamatory article written by the defen-
dant, which was available in California through LEXIS and
WestLaw."9 The court held that publication in electronic form
is not sufficient for the purposeful availment requirement of
personal jurisdiction and the effects test of Calder." Similarly,
in Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc.,"' the Ninth Circuit held
that the trial court did not have specific jurisdiction over a web
84. See id. at 1353-54.
85. Id. at 1353.
86. See id. at 1352-53. The court noted that Pres-Kap may have had no knowl-
edge that the server they were accessing was in Florida and thus could not even
know that they were "availing" the company of Florida based facilities. See id. at
1353. However, even if Pres-Kap had known the Florida location of the database, the
court questioned whether the result under the due process analysis would change. See
id.
87. "[A] contrary decision would . . . have far-reaching implications for business
and professional people who use 'on-line' computer services. . . . " Id. at 1353.
88. No. CV 96-2314 WJR (Mcx.), 1996 WL 662451, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 16,
1996) (unpublished opinion).
89. See id. at *4.
90. See id at *7 (noting that most of the activity and even the injury were direct-
ed at plaintiffs affiliates in Canada rather the California branch); see also supra
notes 61-64 and accompanying text (discussing the Calder test).
91. 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997).
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developer in a trademark infringement case.92 Noting that ac-
cess to a website depends upon an affirmative act by the person
browsing the web, the court held that a website was similar to
an advertisement, which in and of itself was insufficient to
provide jurisdiction without further evidence." Finally, in
Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger," the court found that a generally
accessible website, as opposed to a pay or limited site requiring
restricted use controlled by the website owner, cannot alone
provide a basis for jurisdiction.95  Websites again were
analogized to advertisements in national magazines which are
not targeted to any particular forum and as such lack indicia of
purposeful availment without further evidence."
2. Internet Presence Established for Jurisdiction
In contrast to the cases requiring a high standard for finding
personal jurisdiction when the Internet is involved, a few cases
have held that the mere use of a website is sufficient to grant
jurisdiction. The factors important to these analyses include the
courts' reference to the overall number of Internet users that
may access a website and a fascination with the unique nature
of the Internet medium.
In Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc.,9" a California web develop-
er posted advertisements on his website to promote a national
service he intended to develop. Upon plaintiffs discovery of the
site, a suit was filed for trademark infringement in Missouri.
Other than the anticipated participation of Missouri residents
92. See id. at 420.
93. See id. at 418-19. In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit noted that "no court has
ever held that an Internet advertisement alone is sufficient to subject the advertiser
to jurisdiction in the plaintiffs home state." Id. at 418 (citations omitted). Indeed, the
plaintiff in Cybersell failed to come forward with any evidence of contacts beyond the
advertisement.
94. No. 96 Civ. 3620 (PKL)(AJP), 1997 WL 97097, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997)
(unpublished opinion).
95. See id. at *12. The court noted that a website is "most analogous to an ad-
vertisement in a national magazine . . . [and thus] is not targeted at the residents of
New York or any other particular state." Id. at *10. The court noted that "[national
advertisements also have been held to not constitute sufficient 'minimum contacts' to
satisfy constitutional due process requirements." Id. at *11 n.13 (citations omitted).
96. See id.
97. 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
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in the defendant's future service and 131 hits from Missouri to
the defendant's web page, Maritz had no connection with Mis-
souri."
The federal district court in Missouri held that personal juris-
diction would extend over Maritz 9 The court found that the
trademark infringement was a tortious injury in the forum and
that due process was met."° The court noted a disparity in
mail and telephone analogies as applied to the Internet, but
focused on the unique ability of an Internet advertisement to be
continually accessed at any time for any number of times, the
existing 12,000 Missouri Internet users that potentially could
access the site, and the proposed use of the final site that
would include use by Missouri residents. 1' The court also
mentioned the forum's interests in the dispute's resolution and
hinted that the developing nature of communication should
throw the jurisdictional doors wide open.'0 2
Similarly, in Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.,' °
the court considered a domain name dispute involving trade-
mark infringement. In that case, a Massachusetts web develop-
er posted a web advertisement with a toll free phone number
for computer support under a domain name that was similar to
the plaintiff's registered trademark."° The Massachusetts de-
veloper had no contacts with Connecticut and no evidence exist-
ed that anyone from Connecticut had visited the website or
called the number listed."5 When the Connecticut suit was
98. See id. at 1333-34.
99. See id. at 1334.
100. See id. at 1331.
101. See id. at 1332-33 (finding that the website "automatically and indiscriminate-
ly responds to each and every internet user who accesses" it); see also Cybersell, Inc.
v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Some courts have also given
weight to the number of 'bits' received by a web page from residents in the forum
state, and to other evidence that Internet activity was directed at, or bore fruit in,
the forum state.").
102. See Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1333-34. In this regard, the court cited California
Software, Inc. v. Reliability Research, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1356, 1363 (C.D. Cal. 1986),
to the effect that "while modern technology has made nationwide commercial transac-
tions simpler and more feasible, . . . it must broaden correspondingly the permissible
scope of jurisdiction exercisable by the courts." Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1333-34.
103. 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
104. See id. at 162-63.
105. See id. at 165.
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filed, the defendant asserted that there was no basis for person-
al jurisdiction."°
In what has been considered the high water mark of Internet
jurisdiction, the district court held that personal jurisdiction
would apply for the mere use of the Internet to post an adver-
tisement accessible to Internet users in the forum. 10 7 The
court noted that there were 10,000 Connecticut Internet users
who could possibly access the advertisement and, unlike tradi-
tional advertisements, Internet advertisements had permanent
accessibility so long as the web developer did not replace
them."~ Applying Connecticut's long-arm statute, the court
found that the "permanent accessibility" feature represented
repeated solicitation of the forum and that the Massachusetts
company had purposefully availed itself of the forum through
the advertisement such that due process concerns were met.0 9
As such, the court found that the defendant, by use of its
Internet advertisement and phone number, had directly solicit-
ed business everywhere the Internet was accessible and had
purposefully continued displaying the advertisement to gain
business from the forum."0
In Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen," the court
held that trademark infringement, through the use of an
Internet domain name on the defendant's website, was suffi-
cient to assert long-arm jurisdiction. The court was careful to
distinguish registration of a domain name from "doing business"
within the forum. From this delineation, the court crafted a
distinction between contractual/commercial actions and tort
actions, finding that trademark infringement occurred in the
latter."' Because the court determined that the infringement
106. See id. at 162.
107. See id. at 165.
108. '[U]nlike hard-copy advertisements... which are often quickly disposed of
and reach a limited number of potential consumers, Internet advertisements are in
electronic printed form so that they can be accessed again and again by many more
potential consumers." Id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. 938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
112. "Toeppen is not conducting a business but is . . . running a scam directed at
California." Id. at 622. Toeppen had registered domain names for web pages that
were similar or the same as plaintiffs registered trademarks and then attempted to
extort $13,000 from the plaintiff to permit it to use the domain names for its own
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was a tort, it proceeded to apply the Calder effects test to what
it perceived to be an intentional tort aimed at California. Since
California was the residence of the plaintiff, the injury was
certainly foreseeable."' After satisfying the "but for" and rea-
sonableness requirements of the three part jurisdictional test,
the court asserted jurisdiction over the defendant, although
agreeing that he had no other contacts besides the website and
had not "done business" in the forum."4
3. Internet Cases Dealing with Personal Jurisdiction under
Traditional Contact Analysis
A number of cases have examined Internet contacts under
circumstances in which a party also maintained other contacts
in the forum, either through interaction on the Internet or in
the "physical" world. These cases have consistently held that
personal jurisdiction is proper whenever the nonresident defen-
dant not only maintains an Internet site or uses its services,
but also engages in "contract-type" conduct or similar business
behavior that is continuous, regular, or systematically targeted
towards the forum. These cases predominately involve either
interactive business conducted over the Internet or conduct for
the purposes of establishing an Internet business.
While not fully illustrative of the later analysis of this arti-
cle, a brief mention of several of these cases is helpful because
the reader certainly will encounter them in any subsequent re-
search into the field of Internet jurisdictional issues. First,
CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson"5 involved a defendant who had
an agreement with an Ohio based on-line premium service to
sell and market his software. During the relation, the defen-
dant electronically sent and stored thirty-two files to the server
in Ohio, sold less than $650 worth of software to Ohio resi-
dents, and sent e-mail demands to CompuServe in Ohio re-
questing compensation for alleged software and trademark in-
fringement."6 After recognizing the relaxing rules of jurisdic-
website. See id. at 619.
113. See id. at 620-23.
114. See id. at 622.
115. 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
116. See id. at 1261.
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tion, the court found the actions demonstrated purposeful
availment of the forum's business and asserted personal juris-
diction."7
Second, in Edias Software International v. Basis Internation-
al, Ltd.,11 the Calder effects test was used to find jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant whose defamatory e-mail was
posted on the Internet. The contacts with the forum included
numerous communications, more than $800,000 in sales to Ari-
zona residents, e-mail messages, a website accessible in Arizo-
na, and evidence of employee visits to the forum."9 Upon pro-
viding several Internet paradigms and asserting that e-mail is
similar to other kinds of communication, 20 the court asserted
that the defendant had purposefully availed itself of Arizona
and the effects test granted jurisdiction upon full showing of a
"but for" relationship between the claims and the contacts as
well as the reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction. 2'
Third, in State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc.," the court es-
tablished jurisdiction over a company using the Internet to
promote an off-shore betting operation. The defendants operated
a website, as well as on-line advertisements, that contained
toll-free numbers, credit card solicitations, mailing list inquiries,
and other services for Internet users to contact."m At trial, the
court noted that Minnesota contained over 500,000 Internet us-
ers, that the defendant had transmitted his website to Minneso-
ta residents 248 times and that Minnesota residents had used
the toll-free 800 number, a 900 number, and placed themselves
on the mailing list." The interactivity of the services, coupled
with the intentional posts to solicit business with the knowl-
edge that Minnesota residents were participating, led the court
117, See id. at 1268.
118. 947 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ariz. 1996).
119. See id. at 417.
120. The court noted the similarity of the Internet with mail and phone commu-
nications and then offered metaphorical comparisons with a shopping mall, a high-
way, and a telephone system. See id. at 419.
121. See id. at 422.
122. No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL 767431, at *1 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 1996), affd,
568 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
123. See id. at *3.
124. See id. at *1, *5.
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to find that the defendant had purposefully availed itself of the
forum.
Finally, in Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com,
Inc.," the court asserted personal jurisdiction over a web
"premium" news service in a trademark infringement action.
The court provided a "sliding scale" of Internet jurisdiction
based on a spectrum ranging from low end (posting) to high
end (using the Internet for business purposes or financial
gain).12 The court found that the defendant had contracted
with seven Internet Service Providers located in Pennsylvania
to carry his site and that 3,000 Pennsylvania residents had
made payments to the defendant for full access to the premium
portions of its site.'27 Although the contracts and the website
were the only contacts with Pennsylvania, the court found that
operation of the premium service was a high-end use of the
Internet conducted for business purposefully targeted at the
forum, that the contacts were continuous and substantial, and
that the assertion of jurisdiction was reasonable."
Examining the case law, the reader easily can discern that
when a court must decide an issue of personal jurisdiction con-
cerning a nonresident defendant whose primary or only contacts
exist through the Internet, the analysis is layered with slippery
definitions. The court in such a position must examine the state
long-arm statute's language and determine the meaning of
"doing business," "purposeful availment" and "minimum con-
tacts" in regard to the Internet-a thorny issue when one real-
izes that there is no clear paradigm for the Internet and that
the case law is far from uniform."2 Regardless, a court must
decide when called upon and this is the very position the Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Virginia found itself in
during the latter half of 1997.
125. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
126. Under the sliding scale, "the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be con-
stitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commer-
cial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet." Id. at 1124.
127. See id. at 1125-26.
128. See id.
129. See Swedlow, supra note 1, at 339.
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III. TELCO COMMUNICATIONS V. AN APPLE A DAY11°
Telco Communications was a Virginia corporation which held
a Missouri based subsidiary called Dial & Save of Missouri.
The subsidiary was engaged in selling discount long distance
telephone service in the state of Missouri. An Apple A Day was
a Missouri based corporation with no contacts in Virginia,
which operated as a telemarketer for consumer electronics.
Apple was owned and run by Christina Steffen. After Apple
discovered that Telco's subsidiary was using the "Dial & Save"
mark, Apple brought suit in the Eastern District of Missouri for
trademark infringement in late 1996. Apple alleged that it was
the owner of the service mark "Dial & Save" and that Telco
and its subsidiary had infringed its rights.13" '
After this action was filed, Steffen's husband, Myles Lipton,
wrote several press releases in Missouri and placed them on
Business-Wire for distribution in the target states of Connecti-
cut, New York and New Jersey. Although desiring only limited
distribution to the target areas, Steffen signed a standard press
release form for Business-Wire, which permitted any informa-
tion relayed to Business-Wire to be distributed at no additional
charge to four other categories of outlets: financial disclosure
circuits; on-line services and the Internet; financial databases
and services; and the BW Analyst Wire.'32 This information
was contained in the advertisements that Business Wire sent to
customers. The advertisements also discussed the breadth of
distribution, which included distribution outlets such as
consumer information facilities, some of which were located in
Virginia.133
After the press releases, Telco brought suit against Apple in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, alleging defamation, tortious interference with con-
130. 977 F. Supp. 404 (E.D. Va. 1997). Recall, supra note *, that Telco is a district
court opinion and is subject to appellate review. The analysis hereunder is viewed in
part as a concatenation of prior "Internet jurisdiction" law and in part as a means to
evaluate the direction that this area of the law is headed.
131. See Telco, 977 F. Supp. at 405.
132. See id. at 407.
133. These facilities included America Online, Nationsbank, the Virginia Retirement
System, and numerous investors and brokers. See id.
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tract, and conspiracy to harm." Telco averred that Apple's
press releases and calls to a Maryland securities analyst had
defamed Telco such that the company's stock prices were re-
duced. Following a number of court orders, Apple eventually
arrived in Virginia and asked the court to dismiss the proceed-
ings for lack of personal jurisdiction.'35
Telco asserted that personal jurisdiction over Apple extended
by virtue of the Virginia long-arm statute. 3 ' First, it asserted
that Virginia Code § 8.01-328(A)(4) applied because Apple had
"caused a tortious injury in Virginia by an act or omission out-
side Virginia" and that Apple "regularly [did] or solicit[ed] busi-
ness, or engage[d] in any other persistent course of conduct, or
derive[d] substantial revenue from goods or services rendered"
in the state."7 Second, it asserted that Virginia Code § 8.01-
328(A)(4) applied because Apple caused "a tortious injury by an
act or omission" in Virginia."
In order to analyze these claims, the court adhered to a two-
step process that first assessed whether the facts fell within the
long-arm statute and then whether due process concerns were
134. Telco asserted five causes of action: (1) statutory defamation; (2) common law
defamation; (3) tortious interference with a contractual relationship and reasonable
business expectation; (4) statutory conspiracy to harm business; and (5) common law
conspiracy to harm business. See id. at 405.
135. On May 2, 1997, the court granted Telco a Temporary Restraining Order and
a default was entered on May 28, 1997. See id. After denying Apple's motions to
dismiss and for transfer to Missouri on June 12, the court granted Apple's motion to
set aside the default because Telco had failed to plead the requisite amount in con-
troversy for diversity actions under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See id. In September, the court
considered Apple's Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to
Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See id.
136. The Long-Arm Statute provides in pertinent part:
A. A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who
acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the
person's:
3. Causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this Com-
monwealth;
4. Causing tortious injury in this Commonwealth by an act or
omission outside this Commonwealth if he regularly does or solicits
business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or
derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services
rendered, in this Commonwealth; ...
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1 (Michie 1992).
137. Telco, 977 F. Supp. at 405.
138. Id.
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met.139 While the court noted that Virginia's long-arm statute
extended to the full constitutional range of due process, it also
stated that the contacts of a nonresident defendant may be so
tenuous that, although meeting due process concerns, they fail
inclusion under the long-arm statute. Telco carried the burden
of showing that personal jurisdiction did extend to Apple. 40
Perplexingly, Apple failed to assert that jurisdiction would
offend due process concerns.' Thus, the court looked only to
the first prong of the personal jurisdiction analysis and applied
the facts of the case to the long-arm statute. In both instances,
it held that the press releases served as sufficient contacts to
assert jurisdiction.
In the first instance, the court found that it could assert
personal jurisdiction over Apple under § 8.01-328(A)(4).
Since Apple did not contest that a tortious injury to Telco in
Virginia resulted from Apple's conduct outside the state, the
court limited its inquiry to whether Apple engaged in business
activity or any other persistent course of conduct or derived
substantial revenue from Virginia.' The court readily agreed
that this examination would be based solely on Internet activi-
ty, specifically that Apple "used a commercial entity to merely
post [its] press release."'" The court rejected Apple's argu-
ment under Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King and relied on
Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set to find that it had jurisdic-
tion. 45 Using Inset, the court found that the post was an
Internet advertisement that could be accessed constantly by
Virginia residents.'" The court then held that "posting a
Website advertisement or solicitation constitutes a persistent
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. "Defendants do not assert that this Court's exercise of jurisdiction would of-
fend Due Process." Id.
142. See id. at 405-07.
143. See id. at 405; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1 (Michie 1992).
144. See Telco, 977 F. Supp. at 406.
145. See id. at 406-07; see also supra Part H.B(1)-(2) (discussing Bensusan Restau-
rants and Inset Systems).
146. See Telco, 977 F. Supp. at 407; see also supra notes 101, 108 (Internet ad-
vertisements sufficient to provide jurisdictions). But see supra notes 93, 95 (Internet
advertisements insufficient to provide jurisdiction).
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course of conduct, and that the two or three press releases
[rose] to the level of regularly doing or soliciting business." 47
Second, the court also discovered that it could assert jurisdic-
tion under Virginia Code § 8.01-328(A)(3) since it found that
Apple caused a tortious injury in Virginia."4 While the court
agreed that this section generally requires a defendant to be
physically present in the state, it cited Krantz v. Air Line Pilots
Association International... as support for the premise that
this requirement has been diminished. Under this broadening
category, a defendant that necessarily relies on a Virginia facili-
ty to accomplish the injury in the state may be found to satisfy
this subsection of the long-arm statute.
Krantz involved an airline pilot that was denied employment
with United Airlines after members of the Air Line Pilots Asso-
ciation flooded United with responses asking that they not
employ Krantz. In a prior strike at another airline, Krantz had
crossed the picket line and was blacklisted by the Association
as a scab. Upon notification of Krantz's application with United,
Nottke, an Association member, accessed a database housed in
Virginia and transmitted information concerning Krantz's appli-
cation, which was then distributed to others nationally to pro-
test United's review of Krantz for employment. 5 The court
found that although the nonresident defendant's only contacts
with Virginia consisted of electronic communications with the
database, personal jurisdiction was proper since the defendant
147. Telco, 977 F. Supp. at 407. The court also relied upon First American First,
Inc. v. National Association of Bank Women, 802 F.2d 1511 (4th Cir. 1986), in which
nationally distributed defamatory letters were mailed from Illinois and into Virginia.
Since the content of the letters was targeted at a Virginia resident, the injury was
held to occur in Virginia and personal jurisdiction was proper. See id. at 1517. This
analysis is similar to the Calder test followed by the Ninth Circuit. See supra notes
61-64 and accompanying text (discussing Calder test) Compare First American First,
802 F.2d at 1511, with Panavision Intn', L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616, 620
(C.D. Cal. 1996).
In Telco, the Fourth Circuit's decision in First American First was cited by both
parties, but the analysis was in favor of the plaintiff and the court did not engage in
any analysis except to say that the facts were similar. See Telco, 977 F. Supp. at
407.
148. See Telco, 977 F. Supp. at 407-08; see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1 (Michie
1992).
149. 427 S.E.2d 326 (Va. 1993).
150. See id. at 327-28.
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required the use of Virginia facilities to accomplish the act of
derogating the plaintiffs name and preventing his employ-
ment.1
5
'
Relying on a comparison with Krantz, the court found that
the injury to Telco necessarily required that Virginia facilities,
such as the consumer information outlets, receive and distribute
the press releases.' Since the defendants reasonably knew
from Business Wire's advertisements that this distribution
would occur, the court did not agree that the facilities were not
needed to accomplish the tort in Virginia.'53 Finding that
Krantz was applicable, the court held the defamation, conspira-
cy, and tortious interference claims all required contacts with
Virginia facilities that distributed to the state's investors and
brokers. Moreover, the court found that the injury to Telco
occurred in the state because it was located in Virginia. 1"
Although Apple did not challenge the due process analysis of
jurisdiction, the court addressed the issue in closing.' While
recognizing that mere foreseeability is insufficient to assert
jurisdiction, the court stated that the defendants could reason-
ably have expected being haled into Virginia court with the
knowledge that their press releases would be distributed to
Virginia residents over the Internet.'
IV. ANALYSIS OF TELCO COMMUNICATIONS
The Telco decision is painted in broad strokes of jurisdiction-
al theory. At once, the case recognizes the conflicting results of
Internet jurisdiction cases and then wilfully steps forward to
assert a novel result heretofore unseen in prior cases. Unlike
its predecessors, Telco involves an assertion of jurisdiction over
defendants who themselves did not use the Internet, but em-
151. See id. at 328-29 (citing Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779
(1984)).
152. See Telco, 977 F. Supp. at 408.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id. But see supra notes 79, 93 & 95 (finding that advertisements, similar
to the ones used by Apple, were analogous to placing a product in the stream of
commerce and could not provide reasonable foreseeability of suit).
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ployed another to post the information for them.'57 While the
earlier cases exclusively have dealt with defendants actively
involved with use of the Internet, Telco presents a situation in
which the defendants have sought another party to provide the
Internet contacts. Since such a decision would find jurisdiction-
al grounds over a number of those who are at least one step
removed from active use of the Internet, the basis of the deci-
sion is necessary to examine and dissect.
First, the court's analysis of jurisdiction under Virginia Code
§ 8.01-328(A)(4) requires attention. Recalling that Apple did not
challenge that an act had been committed outside Virginia
causing injury to Telco in the state, the issue remaining was
whether the Internet posts were sufficient to demonstrate regu-
lar and continuous solicitation of business in the state.58 In
its analysis, the court examined three recent cases involving
Internet jurisdiction: Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot
Com, Inc., Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, and Inset Sys-
tems, Inc. v. Instruction Set.5 ' While recognizing Zippo's plh-
able "sliding scale" rule for Internet jurisdiction, the court paid
little more than lip-service to this "well-reasoned opinion" that
explicitly denies jurisdiction when a website merely is used to
post information. 6 ° Although the court agrees in the same
paragraph that Apple's Internet activity was limited to posting
information, they fail to provide any analysis or application of
Zippo's sliding scale to Apple's conduct. Using such an analysis,
the court would have had to find that the Internet activity was
a "low end" use that did not permit an assertion of personal
jurisdiction.'' Instead, however, the court plows ahead into a
157. See supra Part II.B. In the cases discussed earlier, the defendants were web
developers or were actively .using the Internet to send personal e-mail, rather than
relaying information to another party to post information for them.
The author also notes at this point that Telco involves specific, rather than
general jurisdiction, since the defamatory injury was related to the alleged Internet
contacts. See supra notes 13 and 20 (discussing personal jurisdiction analysis).
158. See Telco, 977 F. Supp. at 405-06; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1
(Michie 1992). Recall the requirements of due process as discussed in supra note 13.
159. See Telco, 977 F. Supp. at 406; see also supra Part II.B(1)-(3).
160. See Telco, 977 F. Supp. at 406; see also supra Part II.B(3) and accompanying
notes.
161. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Coin, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124-26 (W.D.
Pa. 1997) (describing the Zippo sliding scale test). The sliding scale test directly cor-
relates jurisdiction with the nature and quality of commercial Internet use.
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dichotomy of the cases standing at opposite ends of the Internet
jurisdiction spectrum: Bensusan Restaurant and Inset Sys-
tems.
162
Apple relied on Bensusan Restaurants"6 when it asserted
that a defendant must be physically present in the forum for
jurisdiction to attach, and the court noticed the factual similari-
ties before it declined to follow the rule of the case."6 The
case, however, is not particularly illustrative for Telco.
Bensusan Restaurants did involve an Internet advertisement,
but the claim was one of trademark infringement and the New
York long-arm statute is not identical to Virginia's statute."8
Most importantly, when the New York court was deciding
whether an out-of-state action caused an in-state injury, the
court also was required to determine whether the defendant de-
rived "substantial revenue from interstate commerce." 66 Due
to the "local" nature of the defendant's business, as advertised
on the Internet, and the almost exclusively local clientele, the
The defendants in Telco used the Internet to post press releases for their busi-
ness, but there is no indication that these posts were interactive or anything different
than an advertisement that would appear in a regional trade magazine that hap-
pened to have subscribers in Virginia. Rather than using the Internet to run a com-
mercial venture or to establish two-way business communications, the defendants, at
most, used the Internet to publicize its business in a way that approximates the
lower end of the sliding scale spectrum. See Telco, 977 F. Supp. at 406-07.
162. Ater agreeing that Apple merely posted information, the court proceeded to
completely ignore the existing case law explicitly stating that an advertisement,
whether in a national magazine or on the Internet, is insufficient for due process
concerns. See supra notes 79, 93 and 95.
The court's dichotomy is appropriate since the question was whether Internet
contacts alone could suffice for an assertion of jurisdiction. Unlike the cases in supra
Part ll.B(3), Telco contained no evidence demonstrating that the defendants had any
other business contacts in Virginia. In the absence of any business contracts, commer-
cial dealings or active pursuit of Virginia commerce, the court could only decide the
issue on Internet contacts that contained no evidence of direct dealing with the fo-
rum. This is not to say, however, that the cases in Part l.B(3) are not instructive,
since this section includes Zippo Manufacturing, which would permit a sliding scale
analysis, and Edias Software, which examined a defamation case similar to that in
Telco except that the Edias defendant had other business contacts in the forum. See
Zippo Mgf Co., 952 F. Supp. at 1124-26 (addressing Zippo Manufacturing test); see
also Edias Software Int'l v. Basis Int'l, Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413, 417-22 (D. Ariz. 1996).
163. See supra Part II.B(1).
164. See Telco, 977 F. Supp. at 406-07.
165. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 298-99 (S.D.N.Y.
1996), affd 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
166. Id.
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court found that the qualification was not met. The holding was
not that the defendant had to be physically present for jurisdic-
tional purposes, but that the defendant's Internet site and busi-
ness were not sufficient to meet the interstate commerce reve-
nue requirements of the New York statute.'67 Additionally, the
court found that the site was similar to placing a product in
the stream of commerce, such that the mere foreseeability of
distant access was insufficient for due process."
In contrast, the issue in Telco did not concern whether Apple
had substantial revenues in interstate commerce, but whether
it was actively soliciting business in the state. Unlike the de-
fendant in Bensusan Restaurants whose clientele was composed
entirely of Missouri residents, Apple's post intentionally was
distributed to reach a multi-state area and solicit business
outside its own forum.'69 Since Apple could not plausibly as-
sert its requirement of physical presence in those states, it is
hard to discern why this claim was raised in Virginia. Addition-
ally, Telco presents an issue of defamation and has greater
similarity to the line of cases examining the Calder effects test
than the cases examining trademark infringement.7 v Unlike
the latter cases, the defamation cases generally find that the
167. In Bensusan Restaurants, the court focused on the "initial matter" of the sub-
stantial revenues obtained in interstate commerce in determining whether King had
established any type of presence in New York, but made no mention of the necessity
or unnecessary existence of physical presence. See id. at 301. The court in Telco,
however, noted that the defendant stated that Bensusan Restaurants required that a
"nonresident defendant must be physically present in a state" for personal jurisdic-
tion. Telco, 977 F. Supp. at 407.
168. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 112-16 (1987) (de-
scribing Asahi Metal's stream of commerce analysis).
169. See Telco, 977 F. Supp. at 407.
170. See supra note 61-64 and accompanying text (detailing the Calder test); see
also Panavision Intn'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (classifying
trademark infringement as a tortious injury and then using the Calder test to assert
jurisdiction); Edias Software Intn'l v. Basis Intn'l, Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ariz.
1996) (using the Calder test to assert jurisdiction in a defamation case in which the
defendant had established business contacts in the forum); Naxos Resources v.
Southam, Inc., No. CV 96-2314 WJR (Mcx.), 1996 WL 66245 1, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug.
16, 1996) (unpublished opinion) (finding that allegedly defamatory article available on
WestLaw and LEXIS alone was not sufficient for jurisdiction, especially where the
target of the article may have resided in another forum).
Although the Telco court cites Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770,
777 (1984), no cite is provided to either Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), or the
Calder test. See Telco, 977 F. Supp. at 408-08 (explaining where a defamatory injury
occurs for purposes of jurisdiction).
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conduct targets itself at the forum in which the defamed re-
sides, such that a single act of defamation represents a pur-
poseful contact with the forum. 7' If Apple's posts indeed were
defamatory, then the conduct was targeted at Telco in Virginia
purposefully and the advertisements were not mere posts placed
in the general stream of information. If so, this also would
defeat Apple's reliance on Bensusan Restaurant and its "stream
of commerce" rationale as applied to websites.
Further, the court failed to cite a number of prior Internet
jurisdiction cases which would have been instructive. The Telco
court could have analogized the defendant's transmissions to
Virginia facilities to the transmissions of the defendants in
Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc., in which mere
electronic access to a facility subject to a leasing agreement did
not subject the defendant to personal jurisdiction in the forum
housing the facility.'72 Additionally, while the Telco court fo-
cused on the possible number of hits that an on-line advertise-
ment could receive, the court failed to analyze the analog to
this proposition: that access only occurs through an afi ative
act of a user who is seeking out information. 3 Additionally,
no argument was made concerning whether the information was
generally available or restricted to paying customers and, even
if the information was placed on a premium service, that this
alone still was insufficient to assert jurisdiction.7 4 The Telco
court, however, apparently neither entertained nor considered
such arguments and instead relied on comparisons with
171. See supra notes 57 and 147 and accompanying text (finding that act of defa-
mation provides grounds for assertion of personal jurisdiction).
172. See cases supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text (discussing Pres-Kap's
finding that mere electronic access or use of a facility in the forum did not provide
personal jurisdiction). But see discussion of Krantz, supra notes 149-51 and accompa-
nying text.
173. See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418-19 (9th Cir. 1997)
174. See Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 97097, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 26, 1997) (unpublished opinion) (differentiating between general access and pre-
mium access sites for purposes of personal jurisdiction); Naxos Resources Ltd. v.
Southam, Inc., No. CV 96-2314 WJR (MCx.), 1996 WL 662451, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug.
16, 1996) (unpublished opinion) (holding that defamatory material available nationally
on LEXIS and WestLaw could not provide sufficient contacts for personal jurisdiction);
see also cases cited supra notes 88-90, 94-96 and accompanying text. While these
opinions were unpublished, the arguments they provide remain viable though without
precedential weight.
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Bensusan Restaurants without deeper analysis of the issues
underlying Internet contacts.
Further, the court's reliance on Inset Systems is equally sus-
pect. Similar to other cases extending broad jurisdiction on the
basis of Internet contacts, Telco highlights the "unique" nature
of the Internet and evokes the impression that an advertise-
ment on-line is analogous to continuously soliciting whomever
accesses the site.'75 Additionally, the court points out the ever-
expanding reach permitted by the advancement of technology
and the ability to affect injury from a distance.'78 The prob-
lem, however, is that merely showing the possibility of access is
not the same as demonstrating actual access.'77 No evidence
in Telco avers that anyone in Virginia besides Telco even saw
the advertisement. While the facts and reasoning of Inset Sys-
tems and Telco are vastly similar, neither decision explains why
an Internet advertisement is a continuous and systematic solici-
tation without further contacts. 78
Such a decision rests on no legal authority, but acceptance of
a conceptual paradigm expedited on a whim. 7 ' An attack on
this concept must be theoretical, not legal, and must argue
175. See supra Part II.B(2).
176. This focus resembles the argument present in International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-20 (1945), for expansion of personal jurisdiction. See discus-
sion supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text. It should be noted, however, that
courts declining to assert personal jurisdiction on the basis of Internet "advertise-
ments" have focused instead on stream of commerce arguments similar to those in
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980), and Asahi
Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112-13 (1987). See discussion
supra notes 43-46, 50-54 and accompanying text. Since the latter cases have modified
the International Shoe minimum contacts doctrine, there is a strong argument that
World-Wide Volkswagen should govern jurisdiction based on the World Wide Web.
177. These cases often point to the number of Internet users who could potentially
see the advertisement, not the number of users which actually do see the advertise-
ment. Compare Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 164-65
(D. Conn. 1996) (relying on 10,000 possible forum Internet users who could conceiv-
ably access the infringing page), with Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp.
1328, 1331 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (using the known existence of 131 hits from the forum to
establish that forum residents were accessing infringing page). Since the electronic
capabilities of the Internet permit a website to keep a running log of the electronic
identity and location of those who log on, it is mysterious why courts resort to po-
tentialities rather than actualities.
178. See Inset Systems, 937 F. Supp. at 165.
179. No case researched for this article provided any legal authority for finding an
Internet advertisement different from an advertisement in a national magazine.
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from analogy. While an in-depth analysis of the paradigmatic
structure of the Internet is beyond the scope of this article,
suffice to say that the battling concepts require some analysis
and discussion in the case law before wholesale acceptance of a
particular model of Internet functionality. 80 Both Inset Sys-
tems and Telco succumb to this unquestioning attitude and thus
fling open the doors to wholesale jurisdiction. Whether the
advertisements in Telco indeed were indicative of continuous
solicitation is not a legal question, but a conceptual question
which is not fully resolved and certainly not completely justi-
fied.
Another issue arises in connection with the court's analysis of
Virginia Code § 8.01-328(A)(3) and its assertion that jurisdiction
would hold since the injury occurred as a result of action in
Virginia. While most jurisdictions hold that a defendant need
not be physically present to satisfy requirements of this
type,'8 ' the general consensus is that some direct contacts
must be established in the forum before finding that the actions
occurred in the forum. Formation of a contract in the state and
regularly transacted business with another in the forum are
excellent examples of the types of direct, purposeful contact
required.'82 Here, Apple wrote the releases in Missouri, sent
the releases from Missouri, made calls from Missouri, and did
not directly initiate any contact with Virginia. The court found,
however, that Apple knew that Virginia facilities would distrib-
ute its advertisements and, relying on Krantz v. Air Line Pilots
Association International," found that the use of the facilities
was an indispensable link between the actions and the inju-
ry." The difference, however, is that the defendant in Krantz
personally and directly contacted and sent information to a
Virginia facility." Apple sent its information to Business
180. For an in-depth discussion of structural models and their application to
Internet jurisdiction, see generally Swedlow, supra note 1.
181. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1264-65 (6th Cir. 1996)
(stating that a defendant may create a presence in a jurisdiction by its business ac-
tions and that physical presence is not required).
182. See Telco Communications v. An Apple A Day, 977 F. Supp. 404, 404 (E.D.
Va. 1997).
183. 427 S.E.2d 326 (Va. 1993).
184. See Telco, 977 F. Supp. at 408; see also discussion supra Part HI.
185. See Krantz, 427 S.E.2d at 327-29
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Wire, located outside Virginia, and then the information was
sent by Business Wire to various facilities, some in Virginia, for
further distribution. Apple had no direct contact with any Vir-
ginia facility and did not request such, although it may have
been aware that the information would eventually be distribut-
ed there.' Using a stream of commerce argument, Apple
could have argued that Krantz was inapposite and that its use
of Virginia facilities was indirect at best and not purposeful.'87
Finally, the defendants failed to contest the due process ele-
ments of jurisdiction. The case provides no rationale or reasons
why the defendants waived any challenges to due process con-
siderations. While the court's analysis clearly supports the spec-
ulation that it would have met due process constraints of mini-
mum contacts, reasonable foreseeability and "traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice," the decision would rest on
the basis of its findings under the long-arm statute." The
court found minimum contacts through the purposeful solicita-
tion of Virginia residents through Internet advertisements, that
reasonable foreseeability stemmed from defendant's knowledge
that distribution would occur in Virginia facilities and that the
defendant's conduct should have led it to expect being haled
into court in the forum. The problem, however, is that the anal-
ysis above demonstrates that the "contacts" elucidated by the
court in part rely upon vague and disputed conceptual analyses
as well as indirect contact with the forum. Holding that these
contacts should provide reasonable anticipation of jurisdiction is
questionable. To hold that a party with knowledge that its
Internet post will be distributed to another forum provides
reasonable foreseeabiity is suspect given the widely conflicting
case law on whether on-line posting alone confers jurisdiction.
186. Compare Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1980) (de-
clining to assert personal jurisdiction on the basis of a stream of commerce analysis),
with Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), and Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S.
770 (1984). The injury in Telco is the same as that in the latter cases while the
contacts and business distribution resemble that of Asahi insofar as the Telco defen-
dant was not selling a national publication in Virginia where the injury occurred.
187. The argument here would have relied upon an analysis in the line of Asahi
Metal. See supra Part II.A and note 13; see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980).
188. See Telco, 977 F. Supp. at 404, 408.
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The answers are not easy and, unfortunately, Telco has not left
behind a convincing legacy of justification.
V. CONCLUSION
Telco Communications v. An Apple A Day is one part of a
quickly evolving puzzle of Internet case law. The issues have
been drawn and decided before the concepts underlying them
have been solidified. Telco provides an observation of how
courts may treat Internet contacts in light of traditional person-
al jurisdiction analysis and inconsistent models of current tech-
nology. At stake is the future development and vitality of the
most powerful communications tool to date.
The principal concern of Internet jurisdiction cases is the
breadth of scope, and Telco is illustrative: what conduct,
through the use of the Internet, satisfies long-arm jurisdiction?
If the definition sweeps broadly, then the Internet opens one to
jurisdiction everywhere where an injury can be shown-just as
the Internet is without bounds, so too is jurisdiction over those
who utilize it. The litigious nightmare of being subject to suit
everywhere hardly needs elaboration and the inability to insu-
late oneself from suit would either require "localization" of
Internet services or abstention from on-line activity."8 9 Either
choice would severely inhibit the continued growth of the
Internet under threat of litigation in a distant forum.
The opposite alternative, however, is equally unnerving. Few
will disagree that the Internet provides the ability to communi-
cate and act globally with rapidity. Prior circumstances clearly
demonstrate that the Internet can be used detrimentally and at
a cost to others. Defamation, consumer fraud, and intellectual
property infringement are all fair game for on-line abuse. An
assertion that jurisdiction should not extend to the defendants
involved often would seem counterintuitive to plaintiff and
forum interests in resolution and convenience.
Inevitably, the third choice leads to the middle ground-the
road of reason-to decide the issue. Again, however, the choice
is difficult. For example, adopting Zippo's sliding scale of
189. See Gotts & Rutenberg, supra note 3, at 343.
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Internet jurisdiction provides the opposite ends of the spectrum,
but still requires that the courts draw arbitrary lines in the
middle-lines based in part on the very concepts which remain
couched in ambiguity and which have established the ends of
the very spectrum they lie upon.'" Further, such arbitrariness
would appear to require in-depth analysis of Internet contacts,
user statistics and degrees of interactivity, turning personal
jurisdiction into a "mini-trial" of contact evidence and dispute.
Further, courts would be forced to draw consistent arbitrary
lines in the sliding scale or else risk fogging the notion of rea-
sonable foreseeability.
The case law after Telco continues to demonstrate the unsta-
ble environment of Internet jurisdiction. While several courts
have favored the Zippo sliding scale analysis, 9' other courts
continue to base jurisdiction on the number of forum Internet
users who could possibly access a site.'92 Further, no concrete
analysis of paradigms has evolved and disparate analogies be-
tween the Internet and other forms of media remain. 93 Addi-
tionally, the very meaning of "doing business" on the Internet
has been left without clear boundaries." Telco left behind an
190. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1125-26 (W.D.
Pa. 1997).
191. See SF Hotel Co. v. Energy Inv., Inc., 985 F. Supp. 1032, 1034-36 (D. Kan.
1997) (using the Zippo sliding scale test to decline an assertion of personal jurisdic-
tion); Transcraft Corp. v. Doonan Trailer Corp., No. 97 C 4943, 1997 WL 733905, at
*1, *9 (N.D. M. Nov. 17, 1997) (mem.) (comparing websites to national advertise-
ments and declining to assert personal jurisdiction under the Zippo sliding scale test).
192. See Animation Station, Ltd. v. The Chicago Bulls, LP, No. 97 Civ. 7527 (JSR),
1998 WL 32459, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 1998) (finding that defendant's use of in-
fringing trademarks on a website dedicated to the Chicago Bulls permitted Illinois
jurisdiction since defendant could have foreseen that Illinois residents would access
the site, although there was no evidence of such); Superguide Corp. v. Kegan, 987 F.
Supp. 481, 487 (W.D.N.C. 1997) ("While the number of hits .. . is not now before the
court, a reasonable inference . . . is that such are numerous inasmuch as North Car-
olina is one of the populated states. .. ").
193. See Hornell Brewing Co. v. Rosebud Sioux Tribal Ct., 133 F.3d 1087, 1093
(8th Cir. 1998) (comparing Internet advertisements to broadcasts over national air-
waves); Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp. 327, 333-34 (D.N.J. 1997) (declining to
assert general jurisdiction over a defendant for Internet advertisements which the
court analogized to advertisements in trade publications); see also Superguide Corp.,
987 F. Supp. at 486 (comparing the passive nature of Internet commerce to a fisher-
man in a boat waiting for the fish to come to him).
194. Compare Quality Solutions, Inc. v. Zupanc, No. 1:97-CV-1228, 1997 WL
835481, at *1, *1 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 23, 1997) (holding that an Internet site containing
an infringing trademark constituted a regular solicitation of business in the forum),
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ominous warning that Internet jurisdiction was far from re-
ceiving a lucid analysis and the subsequent fragmented hold-
ings9 buttress the continued call for a unified solution.
No simple answer exists to Internet jurisdiction. Telco has
sided at the far, and perhaps the farthest, end of the spectrum.
Like Inset Systems, it will provide cannon fodder for plaintiffs
seeking broad jurisdictional authority until a more comprehen-
sive and consistent rule is provided. Until then, the wary
Internet developer perhaps should either monitor its site care-
fully or begin packing its bags for Virginia.
Donnie L. Kidd, Jr.
with Gary Scott Intl, Inc. v. Baroudi, 981 F. Supp. 714, 716 (D. Mass. 1997) (finding
personal jurisdiction under the "doing business" requirement only when the Internet
site is used to solicit actual sales of a particular product or service).
195. See cases cited supra notes 191-94.
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